

UNITED STATES ARMY  
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW  
OF  
BRIG. GENERAL DANA PITTARD

COMMANDING GENERAL  
IRAQ ASSISTANCE GROUP  
MULTINATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ

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24 JUNE 2007

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(This transcript was produced from tapes  
provided by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.)

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P R O C E E D I N G S

(b)(3), (b)(6): This is (b)(3), (b)(6)  
the Multinational Corps-Iraq Historian. Today is Sunday, the  
24th of June 2007. We are at the Headquarters for the Iraq  
Assistance Group at Camp Victory outside of Baghdad, Iraq.  
It is approximately 1520. Also with me is --

(b)(6) U.S. Army Center of  
Military History and the III Corps Writing Historian.

(b)(3), (b)(6) And we are interviewing the  
Commanding General of the Iraq Assistance Group.

Sir, if you could introduce yourself in your own  
voice with your rank, first name, middle initial and your  
last name.

BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Sure. I am Brigadier  
General Dana J.H. Pittard, and I am the Commanding General of  
the Iraq Assistance Group, and also the Assistant Division  
Commander for Maneuver for the 1st Infantry Division at Fort  
Riley.

(b)(3), (b)(6) All right. Thank you, sir.

Sir, my first question is: I wanted to ask if  
you could talk about the command relationship for the  
command, because I know we have the Deputy Commanding General

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1 for Operations who is a United Kingdom two-star General who  
2 has some oversight over this. But if you could talk to me  
3 about what the relationship is between yourself as the  
4 Commanding General and that position also vice the Commanding  
5 General of the Multinational Corps, Iraq. How does that all  
6 piece together.

7 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Okay. The Iraq  
8 Assistance Group is under, obviously, Multinational Corps-  
9 Iraq, and I work for General Odierno. But each of the three  
10 Deputy Corps Commanders or Deputy Commanding Generals for the  
11 Corps have a piece of what we do at the ISF.

12 If you take the DCG-US, Major General Simmons,  
13 initially in the terms of reference had oversight over  
14 transition teams, with the IAG being the direct oversight.

15 Brigadier General -- I'm sorry, Major General  
16 Berragan, DCG-UK, is in charge of oversight of the ISF, and  
17 then Major General Devlin has oversight with Coalition  
18 matters, but also infrastructure matters, too, which also has  
19 gotten us involved with things with General Devlin.

20 So we have involvement with all three in many  
21 ways. But that's when III Corps first got here. What has  
22 morphed and evolved since then is it was just three -- I

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1 guess, three weeks ago, three to four weeks ago, where  
2 General Odierno made the decision that for ISF he wants to  
3 put the finger -- his finger in the chest of one guy, and  
4 that will be the IAG Commander.

5 So what that has done now is broadened what the  
6 IAG does. The Iraq Assistance Group really has three major  
7 functions at this point.

8 One is executive agent for the Corps for  
9 transition teams throughout Iraq, and for some transition  
10 teams it's a direct AD CON (Phonetic) relationship with some  
11 of them but most are attached to MND. So that's number one.

12 Number two is the coordinating agency for MNC-I  
13 for the Iraq Security Forces, for ISF, and that means that  
14 the MNC-I ISF Cell, which is led by a British Colonel,  
15 (b)(6) is in direct support of what we are trying  
16 to accomplish, and we've created what is called now the ISF,  
17 as in Iraqi Security Force, Fusion Cell, and that's huge.

18 That is a new unplowed territory which I am very  
19 excited about, because it finally links us with issues the  
20 transition teams have and they find at all levels and helping  
21 to resolve those issues. So we become problem solvers in  
22 assisting the Iraqi security forces to solve some of their

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1 own systemic issues.

2 Then number three that General Odierno wanted us  
3 to make sure we do is in line with all of that, is the  
4 oversight of LNO efforts with MNSTCI, Multinational Security  
5 and Transition-whatever --

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) Command-Iraq.

7 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Yes, Command-Iraq. Thank  
8 you. I always get mixed up with that. But obviously, we all  
9 know what MNSTCI is.

10 So now the LNOs -- we have LNOs. One is for  
11 CPAT. One is for CMAT, and we do that with MNSTCI, getting  
12 feedback and what's going on with MNSTCI, getting that to  
13 General Odierno, which has now led to a weekly meeting  
14 between General Odierno and MNSTCI Commander, was General  
15 Dempsey, now General Dubik (Phonetic). Every week --  
16 normally, every week, every Friday, they meet.

17 Every other Friday, we are then brought in, or  
18 maybe once in a month, the different GOs from MNSTCI and MNCI  
19 are brought in are brought in to that one, and the agenda is  
20 set by the IAG and approved by General Odierno.

21 So that's kind of what IAG has been doing.

22 (b)(6) General Pittard, I'd like to take you

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1 back to when you first got here in July of 2006, and you  
2 worked, I believe, for General Cherelli (Phonetic) --  
3 Correct me if I'm wrong on that -- in the V Corps.

4 Can you take us through the time when General  
5 Odierno comes in, in December, December 14th, and describe  
6 any changes that take place.

7 In other words, I'm trying to capture what  
8 direction General Cherelli and General Casey were taking you  
9 vice -- or in relation to General Odierno.

10 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Okay. Let's see, General  
11 Casey was the MNFI Commander who was here for two and a half  
12 years. In fact, he was -- I remember when he came on board  
13 when I was a BCT Commander here in 2004-2005.

14 His focus was transitioning, as it should be, I  
15 believe. Obviously, that changed in February 22, 2006, with  
16 the mosque bombing in Samarra, which unleashed this wave of  
17 sectarian violence throughout Iraq, which called for amending  
18 that approach. But transition was key with General Casey as  
19 the MNF-I Commander.

20 General Cherelli fell into that also, of  
21 transition, and we had the Baghdad security plan, Operation  
22 Together Forward II in August-September of 2006, and that was

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1 to secure Baghdad. Obviously, there were some issues there,  
2 and we weren't able to do that overall.

3 When III Corps came in with General Odierno,  
4 General Casey was still in charge of MNF-I. A slightly  
5 different focus occurred, and there was a concern in that,  
6 when General -- Prior to General Cherelli departing, we had  
7 a plan called Transition Bridging Strategy, and the  
8 Transition Bridging Strategy called for a number of things,  
9 but it really called for the Iraqi Security Forces and the  
10 Iraqi government to take more ownership of what's going on in  
11 the security perspective.

12 It called for enhancing our transition teams,  
13 because our transition teams are just between 10 and 15  
14 personnel, normally 10 or 11 personnel. It was enhancing  
15 transition teams with assets from BCTs in battalions to  
16 triple and sometimes quadruple their size, so 30--plus, so  
17 that they can really do an effective and holistic kind of  
18 advising of their Iraqi Security Force counterparts.

19 That changed when III Corps came in. What  
20 General Odierno said was that, look, I agree with transition  
21 bridging strategy, but we must set the conditions to do that  
22 first, and his number one condition to do that was security

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1 as a foundation.

2 So though he said he was committed to eventually  
3 doing enhanced transition teams, he felt strongly that  
4 security must come first.

5 Now General Petraeus came in, really with the  
6 mandate of, hey, we've got a finite amount of time to secure  
7 Baghdad, in particular, but secure Iraq overall, and between  
8 security and transition, security is going to win out. So it  
9 was a different focus.

10 I do believe long term, though, that we will be  
11 here forever unless we do transition. So we've got to be  
12 careful. It is -- Security is an interim -- I'm sorry, it's  
13 a short term goal, but long term it's got to be transition,  
14 and short term right now, and General Odierno has a very good  
15 relationship with the BCT commanders.

16 He goes out and visits them. He listens to them,  
17 and he came back right after taking command, and over the  
18 next 30 days of taking command, he said, hey, BCT commanders  
19 had said that they want transition teams attached to them.

20 So the dynamic change for transition teams by, I  
21 guess, March 1st, were attached to all BCTs, and that was  
22 done because of two BCT commanders, by the way. That's why

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1 they are here now, but supported General Odierno in his  
2 vision on that, and we have moved forward.

3 The change, though, is that, I believe with Iraqi  
4 Security Forces overall is their long term growth has been  
5 stagnant. Our progress toward TRA Level I is almost not  
6 there anymore.

7 We've got a short term gain and focus, which is  
8 security, as it should be, because the times call for that,  
9 but so many of our transition teams now aren't really  
10 necessarily advising. They are LNOs for BCTs in many ways.

11 I wonder if the long term goal of having a  
12 capable, confident and self-reliant Iraqi Security Forces  
13 right now is not being met. Eventually, it will be, once we  
14 have security as a foundation maybe.

15 (b)(6) Where are they stagnating?

16 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: They are stagnating in a  
17 couple of ways. Looking at logistically supporting them, we  
18 had some tough love last fall, which was cut off the fuel.  
19 Now what we are saying is, well, the operations come first,  
20 and we as military folks say, of course, operations come  
21 first. But there's some tough love in there, too, where you  
22 have to say, well, no, we are not going to give you fuel, and

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1 the Iraqis will figure it out.

2 We've got some units that are self-sufficient.  
3 Third Iraqi Army Division up in Maniwah (Phonetic) Province  
4 is self-sufficient on fuel, because we've had tough love up  
5 there, and they have continued transitioning up there. It's  
6 a different focus. It's not like what we have in, say, the  
7 greater Baghdad area.

8 We don't have BCT commanders right now who are  
9 necessarily responsible for the overall progress of their ISF  
10 units. That's not a change with III Corps. That's a change  
11 in Iraq in the last maybe two years.

12 As a BCT Commander here in 2005, we had quarterly  
13 ISF briefs where I as a BCT Commander was held accountable  
14 for the progress of the ISF in my AO, and then I then was  
15 responsible for saying, well, this is what I need from you;  
16 this is what I need from MNSTCI, this is what I need from my  
17 Division Commander, MND Commander, this is what I need from  
18 MNC-I.

19 We don't have that anymore. What we have now is  
20 using the ISF and partnering, and partnering, I think, is  
21 good if you look at it as a triad with the Iraqi Security  
22 Forces at the apex. On each of the other two angles we have

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1 the transition team and the partnership unit. I think that's  
2 a great idea, and it's a great relationship of partnering.

3 We have the partnering, but we don't have BCT and  
4 battalion commanders, Coalition side. They are being held  
5 accountable for the progress of the ISF. They are being held  
6 accountable for security, as they should be also. So that's  
7 their focus.

8 What I'm telling you is that the focus right now  
9 isn't the long term stability of the ISF and the progress of  
10 the ISF, and that would be a drawback, and I hope that we'll  
11 eventually get to that direction.

12 I hope I don't sound too negative. I'm telling  
13 you as bluntly as I can of how I see it.

14 (b)(3), (b)(6) It almost sounds like what you  
15 are saying, sir, is there's been some backsliding in terms of  
16 two years the battalion and Iraqi Security Forces battalion  
17 commander was not accountable. Now he's a little less  
18 accountable.

19 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Well, he is less  
20 accountable for the progress, specific progress and  
21 (Inaudible) level of the Iraqi Security Force counterpart.  
22 If I'm a BCT commander in Baghdad right now, it would be in

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1 my best interest to have the national police and the Iraqi  
2 Army and the IPS in my AO to be as good as they can. I'm not  
3 that involved with their progress, with trying to resolve  
4 systemic issues.

5 I may say, hey, they are on their ass as far as  
6 getting fuel or they are not getting ammo, but I'm not  
7 involved in making that happen necessarily, because my focus  
8 is security only, not necessarily their progress.

9 And yet they have transition teams that are attached to them  
10 that can do that, but many of our transition teams now -- and  
11 it depends on each BCT commander, battalion commander. It's  
12 not the same route. And that's the other thing. It's not  
13 consistent.

14 As many of them were before, they had maybe two  
15 reports a week. Some have 12 reports a week that they must -  
16 - they have. They are now answering so many RFIs, and they  
17 are doing LNO stuff, and not focusing on the original design,  
18 which is advising, being advisors and trainers.

19 (b)(6) General Pittard, what is the TRA  
20 level?

21 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Right. That's the  
22 Training Readiness Assessment, and when a unit reaches TRA

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1 Level I, ideally they won't need their advisors there for  
2 much longer. In fact, the original plan was, once you reach  
3 TRA Level I, then we use the transition teams to go elsewhere  
4 to help other units, because we have a finite number of  
5 transition teams.

6 That's been our issue now with the Joint Staff  
7 back in the U.S. in the Pentagon, is we're saying, hey, we  
8 need more transition teams. They say, wait a minute, wait a  
9 minute, a year ago you briefed that by June of 2007 you will  
10 have harvested 24 different transition teams, because you had  
11 projected, we here had projected, that 24 units would get up  
12 to TRA Level I.

13 We're like at zero right now, because we are not  
14 progressing. We are not progressing for a number of reasons.  
15 I know you asked that question once. (Inaudible) capability  
16 is one. Shortage of leadership, officer and NCOs; and then  
17 the fact that taking them out of their AOs long enough to  
18 train them.

19 It's that the ISF is in the perpetual state of  
20 combat and operations. And, yes, individuals get their  
21 leave, yes, every two weeks. Every four weeks, it's one week  
22 of leave, but that doesn't mean there's collective unit

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1 training going on.

2 We've seen that dynamic change in the national  
3 police. Between MNSTCI and MNCI back in the fall of 2006 or  
4 August 2006, this was made, yes, we will take out an entire  
5 brigade of the national police at a time for redrilling or  
6 retraining for four weeks, which is three weeks, and we added  
7 a week of tactical training, which is needed. So for four  
8 weeks.

9 That has made all the difference in the world for  
10 the national police as far as their progress, and at the same  
11 time, identifying leaders with sectarian biases, and then  
12 removing them.

13 Since that has started, the National Commander of  
14 the national police has been replaced. The two division  
15 commanders of the national police have been replaced. Seven  
16 of the nine brigade commanders have been replaced. Sixteen  
17 of the 27 brigade commanders have been replaced, and the  
18 national police is a much better organization now than it was  
19 a year ago.

20 (b)(6) So when you talk about those  
21 replacements, have they occurred in the last six months or  
22 the last -- or --

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1 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: No. It really started in  
2 November.

3 (b)(6) November?

4 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: It really started in  
5 November. And that's been part of the IAG focus, is where  
6 there is a corrupt leader or sectarian leader anywhere in the  
7 ISF, we move to get them removed. But my point in the whole  
8 thing was the idea of collective training and the difference  
9 that it makes, and we've seen that it does make a difference  
10 in the national police, that many people may not be satisfied  
11 with the national police right now but, boy, are they better  
12 off than they were a year ago.

13 Before, they were an arm of the Shia militias.  
14 Now, yes, they have Shia militia maybe relations, but they  
15 are not an arm in any way, shape or form.

16 (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, one point of clarification.  
17 When you talked about those three issues that are keeping  
18 them from being the original goals for tier one status, one  
19 of the things was shortage of staff and noncommissioned  
20 officers. Is that Iraqi staff and noncommissioned officers  
21 or U.S. noncommissioned officers to train them?

22 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: That's Iraqi. It's

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1 Iraqi, and then sending them to school, sending NCOs to  
2 schools and training, because battle space owners, Coalition  
3 and Iraqi, are reluctant in many cases to let leaders go,  
4 because they are in a fight. That again is that dichotomy  
5 between security in the short term and long term progress of  
6 the ISF.

7 I would argue that the BCGT commanders need to be  
8 involved in all of that, and aren't right now. And I think  
9 that is a change.

10 With the direction we are going right now, which  
11 again I agree in so many ways with the direction we are  
12 going, because we've gone after JAM. When III Corps came in  
13 and said we're not going to take that, we are going after  
14 you, I applauded that, because I thought that was needed  
15 earlier. But my concern is long term progress of the ISF  
16 right now is not going in the direction as positively as I  
17 would like to see it.

18 (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, I wanted to ask you a  
19 little bit more about the manpower piece. You touched a  
20 little bit on it. But in particular, given the small size of  
21 a military transition team, a police transition team, a  
22 border transition team, if I'm not mistaken, you have 14 to

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1 16 people, roughly.

2 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: The majority are 11. The  
3 Division ones are 15.

4 (b)(3), (b)(6) Okay. Given the original plan  
5 of being able to kind of steal people to plus-up when we  
6 thought we were going to be downsizing in number of brigades  
7 here, how is that friction playing out? Is there a manpower  
8 issue on the side of getting enough people to put in our  
9 MTTs, PTTs, border teams? Is there a shortage? Are you  
10 getting enough? Are you getting what you need in terms of  
11 quality?

12 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: A couple of things that  
13 you said. One is it is exacerbated by the growth of the ISF  
14 right now. The Prime Minister's initiative, the Iraqi Prime  
15 Minister's initiative is huge. Between now and December '07,  
16 so in the next six months, we're going to have 27 unresourced  
17 MIT requirements, or transition team requirements that we  
18 just won't be able to resource.

19 So some decisions are going to have to be made on  
20 our part. We have briefed General Odierno on that, on some  
21 options.

22 Between now and next year, we believe that number

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1 will go up to 65, to include the strategic infrastructure  
2 battalions and brigades that are now becoming Iraqi Army  
3 units who don't have advisors or transitions with them.

4 That also includes the Provincial security units  
5 or Provincial security forces like what we see with the  
6 Marines in Al Anbar. That has been pretty successful. They  
7 don't have transition teams.

8 So if you look at sourcing all those over the  
9 next year, that will be 65 unresourced MTT requirements. So  
10 the issue is getting that and knowing that, we as the  
11 military cannot afford to source that many more up and above  
12 what we have.

13 So our solution has got to be an in-theater  
14 solution, which with 20 BCTs -- you almost can figure it out  
15 with 20 BCTs in some cases. And also knowing that for a  
16 brigade sized unit, Iraqi Army brigade which right now has a  
17 brigade headquarters and three battalions, that's four  
18 transition teams. Maybe if you just have two, one at brigade  
19 and one at the time that you rotate, we may need to take some  
20 risks like that.

21 So we think we can figure out in-theater  
22 solutions in that regard with 20 BCTs. But we know we won't

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1 have 20 BCTs here forever. You know, our footprint will go  
2 down from 20 to 15 to 10 over time. So there will be some  
3 issues with sourcing. And the quality -- Well --

4 b 6 No, go ahead.

5 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Getting the quality on  
6 the transition teams is a huge issue. It caused, I guess, a  
7 slight fire storm about, oh, 11 months ago when I said that I  
8 thought the quality of our transition teams was low and that  
9 we need to do a better job of increasing the quality.

10 I asked for sure to have the ability to pick the  
11 06s and colonels that come on transition teams. I was given  
12 that, and I think 50 names were presented to me, and I said,  
13 no, no, no, no, no. And I picked eight of the first 50 names  
14 that came.

15 It has made a difference. The 06 leadership at  
16 Division MTTs, at the National Police division transition  
17 team -- those are the only two I didn't pick, though, because  
18 it was already a deal for the 108th Reserve Division to bring  
19 those in. It was the only two guys I hadn't picked at the 06  
20 level.

21 We asked to pick the 05s. Now because of the  
22 experience of the 06s, the Army said, no, hell, no; you're

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1 not picking 06s, we're not going to let you do it for 05s.  
2 And for 04s, the Majors, who are the leaders of our  
3 transition teams at the battalion level, I'm very pleased,  
4 because the majority of them are coming out of IOE or Command  
5 and General Staff College, from Quantico.

6 We took a lesson -- and that's not just because  
7 Mike is here, but we took a lesson from the Marines. I asked  
8 Major General Rick Zilmer, who had MF-West when I first got  
9 here, how do you do the selections. He said, I personally  
10 select them, and on recommendation, duh, duh, duh. I said,  
11 that's the way to go.

12 So I feel comfortable that we are moving in the  
13 right direction. If you look at -- It doesn't matter if they  
14 are Reserve, Active Duty or National Guard, in my mind. It's  
15 an experienced skill set that matters. But if you are a  
16 Reservist or a National Guardsman, it must be more recent  
17 experience. It must be OIF or OEF as an Afghanistan, Iraq  
18 experience or maybe Special Forces background.

19 Other than that, I would not put a Reservist or a  
20 National Guard leader in charge of a team unless they have  
21 had those experience. It's just, again, from what I have  
22 seen. But picking the right people is what is important.

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1                    (b)(3), (b)(6)            There is one more segue point to  
2    that, which is I wanted to find out what your perspective on  
3    the role of putting more contractors in certain positions and  
4    where that is going.

5                    BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD:    We are moving in that  
6    direction in a couple of ways. With our border transition  
7    teams -- who, by the way, have no border expertise. I mean,  
8    we train them the best we can, but that doesn't make up for  
9    the fact that they are not Customs officials or from the  
10   Border Patrol.

11                   I am personally from El Paso, Texas. I grew up  
12   with the Border Patrol, and I knew that we weren't there, and  
13   the leadership here agreed with that also.

14                   We tried to get more help from DHS, Department of  
15   Homeland Security. But because of pressure from Congress and  
16   probably CNN's Lou Dobbs: we don't have enough for our own  
17   borders, and yet they are out there in Iraq. So they limited  
18   the number of people that they could send here. Originally,  
19   it was just the 12 personnel. Now it's 20. That's the most  
20   we are going to get out of them. But our needs are a lot  
21   more than that.

22                   We believe that every port of entry where we have

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1 transition teams and every border transition team ought to  
2 have some border experts with them.

3 So in order to get around that, working with  
4 MNSTCI, MNSTCI and General Dempsey worked out a contracting  
5 piece where we are hiring contractors to help us with that  
6 expertise, and they have to come from the Customs department  
7 or Border Patrol.

8 In fact, many of them are active, actively in  
9 there, because they are paying them almost double of what  
10 they would make. So we are drawing them.

11 Now there's cries. You know, I heard from -- was  
12 it the Governor of the state of Texas and a Representative  
13 from Arizona that, oh, we are taking away from the U.S.  
14 border which has, obviously, thousands of border patrol, and  
15 we are only asking for 65, and that's working.

16 The first contingent has come in. That first 23  
17 have been trained at the (Inaudible) Academy at Taji, have  
18 moved out to our teams, and with those contractors, that kind  
19 of expertise will not only help our teams but, more  
20 importantly, the ISF, the Iraqi Security Forces, the Iraqi  
21 Department of Border Enforcement will be helped by that, with  
22 techniques. So that is a good thing.

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1           Now also with contractors -- Of course, all of  
2   our -- Most of our interpreters are contracted interpreters,  
3   but we've got a new contract where we are bringing in a  
4   career Special Forces person -- some are Special Forces  
5   American with an Iraqi former military officer, and pairing  
6   the two of them together and putting them in each of our  
7   division level MIT teams to assist them. We are very excited  
8   about that.

9           That first team -- or those first teams will come  
10   in in July. If that works out, then we will start using  
11   those two-man teams at the brigade level and battalion level.  
12   It's a huge contract. We had an option doing it light,  
13   medium or heavy. I proposed light, just to see. You know,  
14   (Several words inaudible) down the road, but I'm excited  
15   about that.

16           So that's some of the contractor piece of it.

17           [REDACTED] Great.

18           BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Let me know if I'm going  
19   too long.

20           [REDACTED] No, no, this is great. This is great  
21   stuff. You had mentioned that the logistics piece of the  
22   Iraqi Army standing on its two feet is weak. Can you

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1 elaborate bit on that? Do they have support battalions,  
2 support groups? Do they have the maintenance piece in place  
3 yet?

4 Can you address that a little bit?

5 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Oh, sure. In fact, the  
6 Iraqi Army is better off than the other Iraqi security  
7 forces, as far as its structure. There is at least a  
8 structure. In fact, when I hear MTTs complain about it, I  
9 keeping them, you haven't seen anything yet; you need to go  
10 to the (Inaudible); you need to go see the national police;  
11 you need to go to Department of Border Enforcement, IPS, and  
12 see their logistics structure, because it's not as mature as  
13 the Iraqi Army's is.

14 I mean, it starts really at the battalion level  
15 with the HSCs. Each battalion, Iraqi Army battalion, has a  
16 HSC -- I guess it's Headquarters Support Company, HSC, which  
17 we all track. We all track the HSCs. At the brigade level  
18 also has an HSC.

19 At the division level, each division has a MTR,  
20 motorized transport regiment, motor transport regiment, which  
21 is a battalion sized unit that has trucks that hauls back and  
22 forth repair parts and all sorts of supplies for each

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1 division.

2 For every two divisions, there is a design.  
3 There is an RSU, a regional support unit that supports every  
4 two divisions. So, for instance, in Al Anbar we have the 1st  
5 Iraqi Army Division and 7th Iraqi Army Division. In  
6 Habbaniya where it just so happens to be the home of the 1st  
7 Iraqi Army Division, there is an RSU set up.

8 The way it is supposed to work is the RSU gets in  
9 support from the national depot. The national depot is at  
10 Taji, and the NTR is supposed to go to the RSUs and deliver  
11 needed materials and supplies to the brigades and battalions.

12 What actually is happening in many cases, the  
13 NTR is going to the national depot in Taji and picking it up,  
14 because there's just stocks of stuff there. Almost all  
15 divisions now have NTRs, a second NTR or 2nd IA Division is  
16 supposed to get theirs. They have been training now for  
17 nearly a year in Numaniyah (Phonetic) Almost all of them are  
18 Shia, and most of them are refusing to go up to Ninevah  
19 Province.

20 So all the training they have done for a year is  
21 almost a (Inaudible). We are going to end up seeing them  
22 with their trucks up there, the Shia that are up there, then

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1 retrain the entire battalion. That's my story.

2           The logistical capability of the Iraqi Army is  
3 getting better. Initially, for food we based it on how the  
4 American Army is doing it, by -- We do contracts now. Of  
5 course, for almost 200 years the American Army was doing it  
6 by cooks, which is what the Iraqis wanted.

7           So we kind of forced upon them this contracting  
8 fuel -- I'm sorry, food contractors and quality of life  
9 contractors, and there have been some issues with that. It's  
10 gotten better overall, but I think that when we leave, the  
11 Iraqis are going to scrap that, because they are not  
12 comfortable with it.

13           Our Corps DCG, General Simmons -- I mean, he had  
14 a very good plan -- said, why don't we -- in his Arkansas  
15 twang -- why are we doing it like that? And I agree. Not  
16 enough -- I don't think there is enough Iraqi involvement in  
17 this Iraqi plan.

18           So from the IAG perspective, it's we talk to our  
19 Iraqi counterpart and say what is it that you want to do, and  
20 how can we help you to reach your goals, as opposed to  
21 imposing a Coalition system that is foreign to the Iraqis  
22 that they are not going to embrace anyway and are just biding

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1 their time until we go. So let's figure out what they want  
2 to do and then support them. That's what we want to do.

3 (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, I was curious in that one  
4 of the things that you talked about was how the present  
5 strategy is has impacted the use of the Iraqi Security  
6 Forces.

7 One of the things, just in looking at one of the  
8 most recent updates and the progress of Fardel Kanoun  
9 (Phonetic), for instance, was looking at casualty rates, and  
10 the one of the good stories is the civilian casualties are  
11 significantly down.

12 If you look at the Iraqi Security Force  
13 casualties as well as our own Coalition force, casualties are  
14 up. If I'm not mistaken, I think it was about 41 percent, up  
15 about 41 percent.

16 What is the Iraqi Security Force leadership  
17 perspective on that, or is that something you have had any  
18 visibility on?

19 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: I have in some ways.  
20 It's interesting. We look at Fardel Kanoun as, you know,  
21 it's a battle for Baghdad. It's on. Iraqi Security Forces  
22 vary on that.

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1           It's not business as usual, but it varies. It's  
2 not the sense of urgency that we have, and we realize that.  
3 There is different timelines, and the Iraqi timeline is our  
4 timeline.

5           Ours is more finite, because we know that, with  
6 pressure from the American people and Congress also, there is  
7 a difference there. But there is also a realization that we  
8 will take casualties, because we are on the offensive. It's  
9 a much needed offensive.

10           If we are, in fact, going to do an offensive, we  
11 should see initially more casualties from a military  
12 perspective, from the Coalition side as well as the Iraqi  
13 Security Forces. So I think that's expected, to an extent.

14           Where we have to be careful, though, is doing it  
15 in front of the Iraqis, leading the way in front of the  
16 Iraqis instead of side by side.

17           We really took great pains a year or two -- over  
18 the past two years, certainly, for pushing the Iraqi Security  
19 Forces into the forefront during operations. That has  
20 changed, where U.S. operations are clearly in the lead.

21           I watched the National Police do an operation,  
22 and I was really surprised in watching it just a month ago

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1 and how it was nine months ago, where before the National  
2 Police were in the lead doing an operation with their  
3 partnership unit in support, providing close-in effects and  
4 just overall back-up with their advisors.

5 Well, just a month ago, Second National Police  
6 provided kind of -- kind of an outer cordon, but they were  
7 kind of a reserve element while they watched Coalition forces  
8 do the operation. I was sort of surprised, maybe because of  
9 the urban center situation now that we basically said we are  
10 going to secure Baghdad, regardless; I don't care who does  
11 it. If we got to lead, we'll lead it.

12 I just hope that that is only temporary, because  
13 if we are not transitioning over to the Iraqis to take  
14 ownership of this, then I think any gains we make will be  
15 only temporary. But we've just got to be careful. But I  
16 agree that we have to gain security first. I just think that  
17 we need to pull along our Iraqi counterparts to do as much as  
18 we are in the Baghdad area.

19 Of course, in Diyala right now we have 2,000  
20 American soldiers up there and about -- what, 1,000 Iraqi  
21 Army folks who are actually assisting with that operation.  
22 That brings a tear to my eyes, because I was in Diyala

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1 before, and we just didn't have (Inaudible) before.

2 Now because the situation has gotten so bad now,  
3 we've had to do that. Hopefully, we can secure it and then  
4 be there and partner with the Iraqi Security Forces until  
5 they really do have it, and then depart at some point. But  
6 we've had to do to Diyala what we did in November 2004 to  
7 Fallujah. They absolutely had to clear it with U.S. troops,  
8 Marines and soldiers.

9 (b)(3), (b)(6) One more segue question, if I  
10 might. Going from there, sir, one of the most emerging  
11 issues is the question of, okay, now we have, you know, what  
12 had started in the Al Anbar Province of the local sheikhs,  
13 local communities saying enough is enough, we want to go  
14 against Al Qaeda in Iraq.

15 So we have these local support options with lots  
16 of different names like Emergency Response Units or Police  
17 Assistance Units. What is the Iraq Assistance Group in that,  
18 and how do you see that evolving relative to also how the  
19 Iraq -- or how the ISF forces will deal with that?

20 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Initially, it was in the  
21 reconciliation realm under eye of Major General Mark  
22 McDonald, from the Corps perspective, and then at the MNFI

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1 level it was Lieutenant General Land, the MNFI DCG -- for  
2 this DCG. But it's going much bigger than that, obviously  
3 now to where now we have to talk equipping. We've got to  
4 talk with CPAT about it, things like that.

5 That's where the IAG has gotten more involved  
6 with it. Just two days ago, there was a BTC led by MNCI,  
7 MNCI Corps Chief, Joe Anderson, to try to get our arms around  
8 that, with everybody that has anything to do with PSUs. I  
9 thought it was a very good idea.

10 Joe Anderson led that effort very well.

11 The IAG piece of that is now to support that  
12 effort, and CPAT's is to now fund it and resource it. They  
13 say they can fund 20 PSUs, and the big question is, well, is  
14 that 20 up and above Al Anbar, which is eight to nine right  
15 now, and they say yes -- no, it includes that. So what they  
16 really mean is there is only 11 more, which we're finding is  
17 not acceptable.

18 So there's issues like that, that need to be  
19 worked out between General Odierno and General Dubik  
20 (Phonetic), which will be worked out, because we work  
21 friendly. But that's part of our involvement in that.

22 You know, the roots of all that actually began in

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1 Tallifahr (Phonetic), I would say, was when (Inaudible was up  
2 in Tallifahr, and other places, but specifically when 1st  
3 Brigade, 1st Armored Division, [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) took  
4 over, he inherited that kind of methodology in Tallifar.

5 When we sent 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division,  
6 down to be attached to MNF-West, he began that in Ramadi, and  
7 it was there in Ramadi where Chief Sattar and working with  
8 then General Anzouma (Phonetic) and [REDACTED] (b)(6) began  
9 this growth. So I want to give Al Anbar, you know, so much  
10 of the credit, but the seeds of that were in other places  
11 also, and specifically on that one. First Brigade, 1st  
12 Armored Division actually bringing -- had different  
13 methodology, which was different from the way MNF-West was  
14 operating at that time.

15 In fact -- You know General (Inaudible), I'm  
16 sure, Colonel -- But he kind of looked at them like, well, I  
17 don't know if that will work, and it actually was very  
18 successful, and now General Gaskin (Phonetic) and his folks  
19 have inherited that and are taking it and moving out with it,  
20 which is great.

21 [REDACTED] (b)(6) General Pittard --

22 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: I'm sorry.

[REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6)

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1 (b)(3), (b)(6) I'll just take a minute here, and pause.

2 (b)(6) General Pittard, you had mentioned  
3 that the leadership of the Iraqi Army was a -- I forget  
4 exactly what word you used, but was a weak area, and I'd like  
5 you to talk a little bit about the Iraqi Army leadership at  
6 the senior level first, and then at the mid- to junior level,  
7 and what are the problems in there? What are some of the  
8 success in that area?

9 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Well, what I said was the  
10 Iraqi Army leadership was an issue as far as the progress,  
11 because of the shortage of officers and NCOs. I'm not sure  
12 that the officers themselves are weak. I mean, it varies  
13 throughout different units, but when you have a strong  
14 leader, it obviously makes a difference.

15 The Iraqi Army now -- Of course, you've got the  
16 Joint Headquarters under General Dahbiquir (Phonetic), and the  
17 next level is the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, which over  
18 this past year we have seen a dramatic growth in its command  
19 and control capability. It now has a Joint Operations  
20 Center.

21 When we first got here last year, the Iraqi  
22 Ground Forces Command had zero units under its tactical

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1 control, tactical command. Since then, they now have six  
2 Iraqi Army divisions, are now directed under the IGFC.

3 Two other divisions are also under Iraqi command,  
4 but it's under the Baghdad Operations Command. That's the  
5 6th IA and 9th IA. So of the 10 active Iraqi Army  
6 divisions, eight are now under Iraqi command. That is hugely  
7 significant.

8 Now that running into when III Corps came in, as  
9 far as, okay, now we are going to -- We have the solution,  
10 the security, it kind of ran into the, well, who is in  
11 charge. And right now with the Baghdad Operations Center,  
12 they are under Iraqi control, but in essence, most of the  
13 units will take their direction from our BCD commanders in  
14 Baghdad.

15 So we'll take a step back in that regard, in my  
16 opinion, as far as Iraqis being able to take the lead.  
17 However, Iraqis, the Iraqi Army, looking at the Coalition  
18 forces as an example, clearly is there, because they've got  
19 some great examples with our BCD commanders and how our BCDs  
20 are operating, but we just got to get them in the lead.

21 Back to the Iraqi Army itself, managing at a  
22 higher level now, the Iraqi Ground Forces Command has really

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1 matured quite a bit. It has now become, according to the  
2 Minister of Defense, Al Bakar (Phonetic), a former Iraqi  
3 Ground Forces Commander, by the way, that Iraqi Armed Forces  
4 Command is his training area, breeding ground for future  
5 Iraqi Army division commanders, and we are seeing that.

6 Many of them are coming out of the IGFC staff,  
7 because the training and the interaction that we are getting  
8 -- What he told General Odierno is I want them to interact as  
9 much as possible with you and the MNC-I and III Corps staff,  
10 because they will learn so much from you. So that's a plus.

11 We are finding at the Division level that systems  
12 are getting more and more in place, and that's mainly due  
13 because we are on our third iteration of transition teams at  
14 the Division level. It's really making a difference at  
15 Brigade and Battalion also.

16 b6 Can you talk a little bit about the  
17 mid- to junior level leaders?

18 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: There's issues there.  
19 It's that it takes time to grow the mid-level leaders, the  
20 majors. The capacity to grow lieutenants in the Iraqi Army  
21 is okay, because they graduate from their equivalent of the  
22 Military Academy once a year. Getting captains takes a little

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1 longer, but it's the majors where it takes more time.

2 The Iraqis have a lot of pride in their staff war  
3 college system, for no better word for it, command and staff  
4 training system. So they are not necessarily willing to  
5 enlarge it, because they really like it to be a little bit  
6 more elite. But the urgency of the situation is the Iraqi  
7 Security Forces, the Iraqi Army in particular, is in a  
8 massive growth right now. So we need more mid-level folks.

9 The Iraqi Army is slowly going to open that up,  
10 but it's just taking time. So there's -- and you can tell  
11 those with that experience and training with a red stripe.  
12 In fact, I guess -- There's a (b)(6)  
13 (Phonetic). He's a battalion commander up in 2nd Iraqi Army  
14 Division, and he put on his red stripe, because at the time  
15 the Coalition force Division Commander a couple of years ago,  
16 then Major General Petraeus, said, yeah, you can wear that  
17 red stripe.

18 Most Iraqi Army officers at the IGFC level can't  
19 even sit in their chairs near this guy, because they want him  
20 to take off that red stripe. But he won't take it off,  
21 because General Petraeus told him he could. The red stripe  
22 means you are a graduate of the command and --

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1                    (b)(6): Right.

2                    BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: -- our equivalent is  
3 CGSC, Command and General Staff College, and there's a lot of  
4 pride in that. I only give that example to  
5 illustrate that there is a lot of pride in training their  
6 officer corps, but we are urging them to open that up more so  
7 that they can get more graduates.

8                    (b)(6): Well, I've heard some discussion  
9 that -- and of course, they come from a different culture,  
10 but I've heard some discussion that, you know, they just  
11 don't have the initiative that we -- They are used to a top  
12 down driven command structure, and we are trying to train  
13 them to have more initiative at the lower levels. How is  
14 that training getting through to those younger commanders?

15                    BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: You know, it's different  
16 levels of initiative. What our transition teams are telling  
17 us is that it is easier to work with the more junior  
18 officers, because they are a clean slate, a blank slate.  
19 They are not -- They weren't necessarily raised as officers  
20 in the traditional Baathist tradition and Soviet style.

21                    (b)(6) Right.

22                    BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Centralized leadership

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1 style. So I mean, that is a comment, but we see initiative  
2 being taken in many different ways. It's just a different  
3 type of initiative. And it's not always clear to our  
4 Coalition counterparts or transition teams at times that they  
5 are, in fact, taking initiative, because it's different from  
6 the way maybe we would do it.

7 What surviving Iraqi Army officers have to do is  
8 take more than just the operational situation in  
9 consideration. They've got to take into account the  
10 political situation. They have to. It's reality here. It's  
11 reality.

12 They also have to take in account religious  
13 factors. If they are an effective commander, they are  
14 getting calls from everybody. If they are a Division  
15 commander, they are getting calls from Council  
16 representatives. They are getting calls from factions. They  
17 are getting calls from the Prime Minister's office. They are  
18 getting calls from all sorts of folks.

19 Even with that, if that's not enough pressure,  
20 then the safety of their own families. Now we can be pretty  
21 big and bad here all we want, but my family is very safe in  
22 Fort Riley, Kansas. It's not day to day knowing is my family

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1 safe, and who is threatening them? In some cases, militias  
2 are protecting their families.

3 So we wonder why -- why aren't you being more  
4 aggressive with militias. So it varies.

5 A very, very good commander, the 9th IA  
6 Commander, Major General Abdullah -- he finally said, that's  
7 it, I'm trying to do the right thing in the Area Command, but  
8 I'm going to retire myself. He just tired of it. He was  
9 tired of getting back channel calls of "you need to go  
10 right," and then someone else would call and say, "no, you  
11 need to go left." He just -- He got tired of it.

12 So he left, even though everybody in the  
13 Coalition tried to get him to stay. He is now back. He is  
14 now the DCG of the IGFC, which is great, but he's out of that  
15 pressure cooker of being the Rahsaf (Phonetic) area  
16 commander. But that is just an example.

17 (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, as a follow-on to that  
18 leadership piece, when we first came in and the decision was  
19 made early on to disband the Iraqi Army and that sort of  
20 thing, and we found ourselves kind of picking and choosing --  
21 Hey, (b)(6) he seems to be a pretty good guy, let's make him  
22 an Iraqi battalion commander -- how are those guys working

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1 into the mix now? Are they still in the system, compared to  
2 guys who were guys who had come back from the old Iraqi Army?  
3 How is that working itself out or do you have visibility on  
4 that?

5 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Oh, we do, in many cases.  
6 Obviously, it was a huge error to demobilize or get rid of  
7 the Iraqi Army. So when the ICDC, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps,  
8 was created, the Iraqi National Guard was the next level.  
9 But at the same time, the NIA, New Iraqi Army, was being kind  
10 of trained at Kirkush training area in eastern Diyala.

11 Eventually, the ING became Regular Iraqi Army.  
12 We are still seeing some issues with that now. We have  
13 issues with promotion and pay problems with folks because of  
14 the way they actually came into the Iraqi Army. But they  
15 were originally ING. They are now that the MOD has stood up,  
16 we are back to the old Iraqi Army traditions in many cases,  
17 they kind of look down on them, like "you're just ING."

18 We had a case just on Saturday with a guy named  
19 (b)(6) (Phonetic) who was this awesome fighting  
20 battalion commander in Muktadiya (Phonetic) in Diyala  
21 Province just two years ago.

22 In fact, his battalion was the 205th Iraqi Army

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1 Battalion. It was named by name in a speech by then  
2 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as being one of the top  
3 two Iraqi Army battalions in the country. The senior  
4 commander then was General Petraeus. He believed the same  
5 thing.

6 General Petraeus a few months ago asked, whatever  
7 happened to (b)(6) Well, his family was threatened,  
8 and he ended up leaving, leaving the country. We did track  
9 him down. I told General Petraeus, he's back. He said, oh,  
10 let's get him back in there; we need his help in Diyala.  
11 Sounds good. I wrote a letter. General Petraeus did a cover  
12 letter, and we sent it to the Minister of Defense.

13 They deliberated on that on Saturday, as they  
14 were picking the Brigade Commander, but they just could not  
15 bring themselves to pick this guy. They all agree he's a  
16 good fighter. He had made a difference. He stabilized  
17 Muktadiya, which is out of control right now, but they could  
18 not bring their -- I don't know -- their proud, elitist  
19 Iraqi viewpoints into reinstalling him.

20 (b)(6) Because he was a National Guard?

21 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Well, he was INGO. Oh,  
22 he's INGO. What is his pedigree? Oh.

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1           We had our IGFC MTT leader, (b)(6)  
2   (Phonetic), on a break, called me by cellphone: Hey, they  
3   are deliberating now; they're deliberating now. So what are  
4   they -- I just don't think they are going to sign that  
5   through.

6           I thought, if a letter from General Petraeus  
7   can't even do it, what can? So to me, that's an illustration  
8   of some of the issues of people that the Coalition had a lot  
9   of belief in, that the Iraqi Army -- and do you blame them?

10          I mean, it's a proud Iraqi Army, and they are  
11   saying, okay, no, we are now standing back up, but we are  
12   standing back up in the Sovereign Iraq; but for those of you  
13   who worked with the Coalition, nah, you're just this side of  
14   being collaborators.

15          They never say it quite like that, but even  
16   (b)(6) (Phonetic) who General Petraeus thinks  
17   the world of -- he's still the Battalion Commander up there  
18   in JAG-North, which is south of Baghdad in this little desert  
19   location -- he's been short personnel for a while.

20          They just won't send him -- They will now,  
21   because General Petraeus has taken that as I want personnel  
22   for that one battalion. But anybody who we embrace too much

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1 is looked on with a certain level of suspicion.

2 So because of that, we tell that to our  
3 transition teams, because our transition teams will get  
4 frustrated when they are trying to urge a battalion commander  
5 to take action, and they have this squared-away captain or  
6 major -- "why don't you use (b)(6) (Phonetic); he's the  
7 greatest thing since sliced bread?" Well, the fact that they  
8 are putting so much praise on him, it's almost insulting the  
9 rest of the Iraqi Officer corps who then will -- who often  
10 marginalize him after we are not -- you know, when we are not  
11 looking or we are not around or whatever.

12 So a more complex way of doing this is: If you  
13 see somebody you really think is good, you should then back  
14 away from them, and then kind of say, hey, there's a group  
15 there, I think these three are pretty good, and you include  
16 that guy in it.

17 It's just a different approach that we've found  
18 is much more successful, instead of completely embracing  
19 them; because we are the people who did invade this country.  
20 I mean, there is a certain level of shame on the Iraqi Army  
21 side, whether you share that or not.

22 b 6 I've got one last question.

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1 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: I'm sorry if I'm rambling  
2 too much.

3 (b)(6) No, no, that's great, all good stuff.

4 I'd like to talk a little bit about the sectarian  
5 issue in the Iraqi Army, and how that is playing out at the  
6 division level and below, and even at the Iraqi Ground Force  
7 Command Headquarters.

8 You know, are the -- Just talk to that issue and  
9 the difficulty of working through it.

10 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Well, the Iraqi Army or  
11 Iraqi Security Forces?

12 (b)(6) Well, Iraqi Security Forces.

13 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: Okay. I can take each in  
14 a piece.

15 We really want our transition teams to look at  
16 that. I've been turning to the "Inspector Cleuceau" of  
17 sectarianism amongst the Iraqi Security Force leadership  
18 (Inaudible), and we found it an interesting dynamic.

19 When it's in a unit, the Shias and Sunnis appear  
20 to be getting along in units, in the actual units that  
21 they're at, in 9th IA, in the actual units. I said, yeah,  
22 sure, right; I don't believe it. But in fact, I've heard it

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1 too many times from transition teams to where I now believe  
2 it, that in a unit the Shias and Sunnis in a unit, that they  
3 are getting along just fine.

4 When it comes to dealing with neighborhoods and  
5 in areas where there is either Sunni or Shia militias or  
6 influences, it becomes a little different on how the  
7 character of the unit acts overall.

8 The Iraqi Army is less vulnerable to that kind of  
9 localized sectarianism. So if you looked on a scale of who  
10 is most vulnerable and who is the least vulnerable, the Iraqi  
11 Army right now is the least vulnerable to that in most areas.

12 Now in some areas like the 10th IA in Basra, it's  
13 all Shia. So, yes, they lean toward Shias. They are all  
14 Shia just about, and they are in a Shia area. That's not  
15 really the issue.

16 The issue comes in to where within a Shia area  
17 they come into conflict with militia. 8th IA had kind of a  
18 delay in many ways, with Major General Oathman who has fought  
19 JAM in Diwaniyah, because JAM is disrupting stability there.

20 So I almost see that as the way of the future for  
21 Iraq, in that eventually when we are all gone, there will be  
22 issues among Shias. It won't be the Shias united against

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1 Sunnis necessarily. But back to sectarianism, the Iraqi Army  
2 field is the least vulnerable.

3 Of course, on the other end is the FPS,  
4 Facilities Protection Service, which is absolutely the most  
5 vulnerable, because they owe their allegiance to whoever -  
6 whatever ministry has hired them, which is each ministry is -  
7 - It's based on a political party, because four or five  
8 ministries are under Assaderists (Phonetic).

9 Also in the most vulnerable category is the IPS,  
10 the local police, the Iraqi Police Service, because they are  
11 most vulnerable to local conditions, because they live in  
12 those neighborhoods. So again, I'll stop JAM at checkpoints  
13 until JAM tells me, no, you can't stop me tomorrow, because I  
14 know you, I know your family, I know where you live; and I'm  
15 poor. I can't move my family to Egypt and Syria. So they  
16 are most vulnerable in that most vulnerable category.

17 In the middle area is probably Department of  
18 Border Enforcement. There's some sectarian influences. It's  
19 kind of the way we've done it. On the Syrian border we have  
20 all Sunnis there, and many of them are from the Shamarra  
21 (Phonetic) tribe, which is there on the Syrian border. So  
22 there's some inbred corruption, but not necessarily

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1 sectarianism.

2           Now if we remove the Sunni guards on the Syrian  
3 border and put Shias there, it might be more sectarian. Just  
4 like on the Iranian border, almost all of them are Shia with  
5 the exception of in the KRG, Kurdish.

6           Then the National Police would be from the middle  
7 to more sectarian, because they are largely Shia, though  
8 we've really made an effort to change that.

9           There are almost no Sunni commanders in the  
10 National Police when we first got here. Now about 50 percent  
11 of the Division Commanders, one of two, is Sunni. Four of  
12 nine brigade commanders are Sunni. Seven or eight, depending  
13 on what day it is -- seven or eight of the battalion  
14 commanders -- I'm sorry, nine of the battalion commanders of  
15 the 27 are Sunni.

16           That is at least going in the right direction.  
17 But there are sectarian influences, and it starts, I think,  
18 at the GOI -- not starts, but it's also at the GOI, because  
19 Prime Minister Maliki himself appears to be suspicious of  
20 Baathists and Sunnis that are in the Iraqi Army, Iraqi  
21 Security Forces. He is just concerned, and I don't blame  
22 him. He's lived a life here in Iraq, but that has now

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1 manifested itself into OCINC, and my favorite lady in all  
2 Iraq, (b)(6) (Phonetic) -- and she is, obviously -- I  
3 think she is evil, but she is pushing the Shia agenda, which  
4 she as the principal advisor for Military Affairs for the  
5 Prime Minister had no problems with calling directly down to  
6 the Division Commanders and telling them the different things  
7 they needed to do or get rid of so-and-so.

8 If there is an Iraqi Army or National Police  
9 commander that actively fought JAM, you know that they would  
10 hear something. (b)(6) (Phonetic) who was a  
11 commander of the 3rd National Police Brigade, was working  
12 very well in West Rasheed with our 4th Brigade, 1-ID and 1st  
13 of the 28th Infantry, and they are fighting JAM, helping  
14 (Inaudible) and fighting Jaish al-Mahdi. Has removed, and  
15 that was a shame that that occurred.

16 So there are some --

17 (b)(6) Did that happen recently?

18 BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: That happened -- oh, was  
19 it April? I think it was April when that happened.

20 We've had a few other instances of that. General  
21 Abdullah -- he got calls from (b)(6) and this OCINC,  
22 the Office of the Commander in Chief, the Prime Minister.

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1 Again, there are so many different inputs to what the  
2 government is doing.

3           Sectarianism isn't necessarily on-purpose  
4 sectarianism, but it is the making sure that the Shia agenda  
5 and the Shia dominated government remains. Do I understand  
6 that? Yeah, I do. I just don't like it, especially as we  
7 think reconciliation is the way to go. But that may not be  
8 what the Shia dominated government really wants.

9           (b)(3), (b)(6) Sir, I'm just trying to get you  
10 back on your schedule. Is there anything we haven't asked  
11 you that you feel like you want to --

12           BRIG. GENERAL PITTARD: No. I feel like I've  
13 gone too far with the answers, but I told you --

14           (b)(3), (b)(6) It's actually great, sir.  
15 Thanks very much. That concludes this interview.

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